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ANALOGY BREAKERS: A REALITY CHECK 
ON EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
Luke M. Milligan 
INTRODUCTION 
Like it or not, the analogy is indispensable to legal reason-
ing. This maxim is perhaps best exemplified by the perennial 
attempts of jurists to fold the particulars of cyberspace into 
established criminal procedure doctrine. An e-mail is just like 
regular mail.1 Or isn‟t it? That holds for text messages!2 Or 
doesn‟t it? Laptop searches at the border: like luggage?3 How 
about GPS? It‟s a modernized form of the “beeper” from Knotts 
and Karo?4 I think. 
In search of the “right” analogy to mediate new technology 
and old rules, courts and commentators naturally hone in on 
technological “functions.” Cell phones, in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment, provide a good illustration. Government 
  
  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law. The author is 
grateful for comments received at the 2010 Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum held 
at the University of Aix-Marseilles III (Provence). In addition I would like to thank 
Bartley Hagerman for his diligent research assistance. 
 1 See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 474-75 (6th Cir. 2007) (analo-
gizing screening of postal mail to screening of e-mail, and concluding that persons have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of e-mails), vacated on other 
grounds, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 2 See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“We see no meaningful difference between the e-mails at issue in Forrester and the 
text messages at issue here [and] we also see no meaningful distinction between text 
messages and letters.”); see also United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“[E]-mail to/from addresses . . . constitute addressing information and do not 
necessarily reveal any more about the underlying contents of communication than do 
phone numbers.”). 
 3 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Arnold has 
failed to distinguish how the search of his laptop and its electronic contents is logically 
any different from the suspicionless border searches of travelers‟ luggage . . . .”). 
 4 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007) (discuss-
ing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705 (1984)). 
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lawyers regularly claim that cell phones should be treated like 
“address books” because they share a functional role: aggregat-
ing contact information of friends and associates. Yet defense 
lawyers counter that cell phones should be treated like laptop 
computers because both facilitate word processing and internet 
access. While some courts buy the first analogy, and others the 
second, it is important to understand that both decisions rest 
on a common premise: that a functional analogy is a sufficient 
condition of legal reasoning. 
I will leave the ongoing debates regarding functional equi-
valence for others. Taking a more collateral approach, this pa-
per critiques the “mono-analogical” framework channeling the 
debate. The term “mono-analogical” designates a brand of ana-
logical reasoning where only a single dimension of a subject is 
mapped.5 I argue that the prevailing mono-analogical approach 
to cyber-issues (which places near-exclusive emphasis on a 
technological instrument‟s functional role) is indeterminate, 
undisciplined, and in disregard of the subtler lessons of land-
mark Fourth Amendment opinions such as United States v. 
Knotts and Kyllo v. United States.6 
In this article I call for a shift in constitutional criminal 
procedure adjudication, away from the mono-analogical and 
toward the poly-analogical. A poly-analogical framework in-
vites courts to reflect on not only matters of functional equiva-
lence, but also on the more practical implications of a new in-
strument‟s emergence. Examples of an instrument‟s non-
functional dimensions include frequency of use, storage capaci-
ty, efficiency, and ability to facilitate information aggregation.7 
Importantly, courts can incorporate the poly-analogical frame-
work through application of a simple doctrinal test which I 
  
 5 In the cell phone decisions, one dimension (the phone‟s functionality) is generally 
mapped. So, as a practical matter, if the court believes that the functionality of a cell 
phone is like a pager or address book, the warrantless search is reasonable; if not, it is 
unreasonable. 
 6 Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 7 “Prevalence” is doctrine-specific. For “search incident” issues, prevalence in-
cludes “frequency of use” within grab area and “storage capacity.” For evaluating “ex-
pectations of privacy,” the “prevalence” factors would be “cost of use” and “effective-
ness.” See discussion infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
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term the “analogy breaker.” This proposed test can be applied 
to most any intersection of criminal procedure and cyberspace 
technology. 
I. ANALOGICAL REASONING IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The intersection of criminal procedure and cyberspace is 
marked by a flawed method of analogical reasoning. We begin 
our analysis with a brief and general discussion of the role of 
the analogy in legal reasoning. 
A. Analogy in Law 
“There is no word,” observed John Stuart Mill, “which is 
used more loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than 
[a]nalogy.”8 A typical definition is “[a] form of logical inference 
or an instance of it, based on the assumption that if two things 
are known to be alike in some respects, then they must be alike 
in other respects.”9 Over the past decades, numerous scholars 
have examined the role of analogical reasoning in judicial deci-
sionmaking.10 The “characteristic form of analogical thought in 
  
 8 2 JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE: BEING 
A CONNECTED VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND THE METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC 
INVESTIGATION 87 (London, Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer 9th ed. 1875). 
 9 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 64 (4th ed. 
2009). “Analogy” is most often confused with “metaphor” and “inductive inference.” See 
id. at 1104 (defining “metaphor” as “[a] figure of speech in which a word or phrase that 
ordinarily designates one thing is used to designate another, thus making an implicit 
comparison.”); see also Dan Hunter, Reason is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in 
Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1206-11 (2001) (emphasizing the differences between analo-
gy and inductive reasoning). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 89 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (claiming that analogy and induction 
are one in the same). 
 10 For recent discussions of analogical reasoning in law, see generally Larry Alex-
ander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57 (1996); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reason-
ing: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353 
(1997); Hunter, supra note 9; Frederick Schauer, Why Precedent in Law (and Else-
where) is Not Totally (or Even Substantially) about Analogy, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 454 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Emily 
Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999); 
Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993). For earlier 
treatments, see generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9-
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law,” wrote Professor Sunstein, “appears to work in four simple 
steps”: 
(1) Some fact pattern A has a certain characteristic X, or 
characteristics X, Y, and Z; (2) Fact pattern B differs from 
A in some respects but shares characteristics X, or charac-
teristics X, Y, and Z; (3) The law treats A in a certain way; 
(4) Because B shares certain characteristics with A, the 
law should treat B the same way.11 
While analogical reasoning is particularly attractive to 
judges confronting technologies that were not likely foreseen at 
the time of the drafting of relevant legislation or precedent,12 
the use of analogical reasoning to mediate old rules and emerg-
ing technologies has led to mixed results.13 As Professor Cohen 
has observed, whenever “new technologies have entered the 
market, courts have similarly struggled in analogizing them to 
older technologies . . . .”14 Gaffes include the “legal confusion 
surrounding the analogizing . . . of the telephone to the tele-
graph” and the failure of courts to initially recognize radio and 
film as protected forms of speech.15 Perhaps no analogical mis-
  
27 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1949); RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: 
TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 25-30 (Stanford Univ. Press 1961). 
 11 See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 745. 
 12 See Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The 
Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265, 
267 (2002); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶8 (stating that courts generally avoid or cut short “reasonable expec-
tation of privacy analysis for modern electronic communications because the analysis 
pushes [judges] beyond their [judicial] competence”); Stephanie A. Gore, “A Rose by 
Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors for New Technologies, 2003 J.L. TECH. & 
POL‟Y 403, 408 (noting that a significant number of Americans are “technophobic” and 
reasoning that if judges are similar to the vast number of Americans, they may be more 
willing to accept metaphors and analogies for new technologies rather than undertak-
ing the task of understanding whether the metaphors and analogies fit the particular 
legal question before them). 
 13 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (“The judiciary risks 
error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging tech-
nology before its role in society has become clear.”) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438 (1928)). 
 14 See Blavin & Cohen, supra note 12, at 268. 
 15 Id. (citing ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 100 (1983)); see 
Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm‟n, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915) (stating that films were 
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step was greater than that of Olmstead v. United States.16 The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation had used wiretaps to obtain 
evidence of a conspiracy to transport and sell liquors.17 Finding 
that the wiretaps were installed without a physical trespass, 
Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, concluded that no 
Fourth Amendment “search” had occurred.18 The Court analo-
gized as follows: numerous Fourth Amendment cases of the 
Court had involved facts without a physical trespass; in none of 
the cases without a physical trespass had there been a Fourth 
Amendment “search”; the mere use of a wiretap causes no 
physical trespass; thus the mere use of a wiretap does not con-
stitute a Fourth Amendment “search.”19 
Looking to improve on this “bad track record,”20 lower 
courts in the United States are searching, as I write, for the 
right analogies to mediate old doctrine and new cyber-
technologies. Just a brief survey of current criminal procedure 
litigation reveals a host of prevailing analogies. These include 
(but are certainly not limited to) analogies between the content 
of letters and e-mail; letters and texts; envelopes and e-mail 
addresses; envelopes and e-mail subject lines; shopping and 
web-browsing; “beepers” and GPS tracking; and border 
searches of luggage and laptops.21 
In their attempts to “cyberize” criminal procedure doc-
trine, courts regularly utilize a form of legal reasoning that I 
term “mono-analogical.”22 By “mono-analogical” I mean that 
  
“moving pictures” rather than a traditional method of expression, and thus not subject 
to First Amendment protection), overruled by United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); City of Richmond v. S. Bell, Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 
761, 773-78 (1899); see also United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (“[U]se of a 
searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass.”). 
 16 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 17 Id. at 455. 
 18 Id. at 466. 
 19 Id. Of course the Court reversed itself nearly forty years later in Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 20 See Blavin & Cohen, supra note 12, at 267. 
 21 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The 
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for 
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004). 
 22 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
1324 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 80:4 
only one dimension of a subject is mapped during the adjudica-
tion. To illustrate “mono-analogical” reasoning, the following 
paragraphs profile a particular point of intersection between 
criminal procedure and cyber-technologies: the incorporation of 
cell phones into the “search incident to arrest” doctrine. 
B. Illustrating Mono-Analogical Reasoning 
One of the oldest exceptions to the warrant requirement 
concerns searches incident to lawful arrests. The exception, at 
its core, encompasses searches of an arrestee‟s person and 
those items found within the arrestee‟s “grab area.”23 Over the 
past decades warrantless searches of wallets, purses, tablets, 
pagers, and address books have been held to be “reasonable” 
under the “search incident” doctrine.24 
In recent years, lower courts have been tasked with me-
diating the “search incident” rules and cell phone technolo-
gies.25 The courts are routinely asked by government lawyers to 
treat cell phones like pagers, address books, or general con-
tainers. Their claim is that the “Contact List” on such phones 
serves a particular functional role—that of organizing contact 
  
 23 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). The scope of such a search varies depending on whether 
the arrestee was a recent occupant of a vehicle. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 
460-61 (1981), holding limited by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
 24 See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (pager); United 
States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (wallet and address book); Unit-
ed States v. McFarland, 633 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1980) (notebook paper); United 
States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 1979) (purse); United States v. Gonzalez-
Perez, 426 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1970) (purse); United States v. Frankenberry, 387 
F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1967) (diary); Grillo v. United States, 336 F.2d 211, 212 (1st Cir. 
1964) (wallet); United States v. Vaneenwyk, 206 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(day planner); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535-36 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (pag-
er). The concept of “grab area” is curtailed, at certain points, by due process considera-
tions. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (holding that absent “clear 
indication” evidence will be found, warrantless searches incident to arrest are unrea-
sonable if they “involv[e] intrusions beyond the body‟s surface”). 
 25 While the analogical reasoning in “search incident” cases might be ultimately 
irrelevant if Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, is extended to non-vehicle cases, the flaws of mono-
analogical reasoning, as illustrated here in particular, would still be generally true and 
therefore hold in other doctrinal corners of constitutional criminal procedure. See infra 
note 66. 
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information—and that items that serve such a role, when found 
within an arrestee‟s grab area, can be searched without a war-
rant following a lawful arrest. The government‟s argument can 
be framed as follows: 
(1) Address books and pagers have certain functions X and 
Y; (2) Cell phones differ functionally from address books 
and pagers in some respects (they also offer Z), but share 
functions X and Y; (3) The law permits warrantless 
searches of address books and pagers found within an ar-
restee‟s grab area; (4) Because cell phones share functions 
X and Y with address books and pagers, the law should 
permit warrantless searches of cell phones found within an 
arrestee‟s grab area. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, those judges holding cell phone 
searches to be “reasonable” have routinely drawn analogies to 
address books,26 pagers,27 or general containers.28 As a recent 
district court observed: “Decisions of district courts and Courts 
of Appeals (often analogizing cell phones to the earlier pager 
technology) trend heavily in favor of finding that the search 
  
 26 United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *2-*4 (E.D. Wis. 
Feb. 8, 2008) (analogizing cell phones to, inter alia, address books); United States v. 
Urbina, No. 06-CR-336, 2007 WL 4895782, at *13-*14 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007) (analo-
gizing cell phones to, inter alia, address books); United States v. Cote, No. 03-CR-271, 
2005 WL 1323343, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005) (“Searches of items such as wallets 
and address books, which I consider analogous to Cote‟s cellular phone since they 
would contain similar information, have long been held valid when made incident to an 
arrest.”) (citing Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776). 
 27 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007) (analogizing cell 
phones to pagers); United States v. McCray, No. CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607, at *4 
(S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2009) (“A cell phone, like a beeper, is an electronic „container,‟ in that 
it stores information that may have great evidentiary value (and that might easily be 
destroyed or corrupted).”); Valdez, 2008 WL 360548, at *2-*4 (analogizing cell phones 
to, inter alia, pagers). 
 28 Finley, 477 F.3d at 259-60 (finding that the “search incident” doctrine “extends 
to containers found on the arrestee‟s person” and concluding that search of a cell 
phone‟s stored text messages was reasonable); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 
104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) (“I see no principled basis for distinguishing a warrantless 
search of a cell phone from the search of other types of personal containers . . . .”); see 
also People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011) (finding that warrantless cell phone 
searches incident to arrest are reasonable because cell phones are “property”). 
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incident to arrest or exigent circumstances exceptions apply to 
searches of the contents of cell phones.”29 
While the government claims a functional analogy be-
tween cell phones and address books, defendants not only con-
test such an analogy, but counter with a preferred analogy of 
their own: one between cell phones and laptop computers.30 
Cell phones, they explain, organize large amounts of informa-
tion, and in more recent models, facilitate word processing and 
internet access. Their argument, in its essence, can be framed 
as follows: 
(1) Laptop computers have certain functions A and B; (2) 
Cell phones differ functionally from laptops in some re-
spects (they do not offer functions C and D), but share 
functions A and B; (3) The law does not permit warrantless 
searches of laptops found within an arrestee‟s grab area; 
(4) Because cell phones share functions A and B with lap-
tops, the law should not permit warrantless searches of 
cell phones found within an arrestee‟s grab area.31 
Courts finding warrantless searches of cell phones incident to 
arrest to be “unreasonable” have uniformly rejected the pro-
posed analogy to address books, pagers, or containers, and they 
have regularly (though not always) adopted the defense‟s coun-
ter-analogy to the laptop.32 
  
 29 Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 109. Not surprisingly some lower courts have left the 
underlying analogies unstated, disposing of the legal claims by resort to citations to 
authority. See United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(citing Finley, 477 F.3d at 258-60); United States v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 
1101-04 (D. Ariz. 2008)). 
 30 While it seems to be generally understood that warrantless searches of laptop 
computers incident to arrest are not “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, there 
are surprisingly few cases on point. For one example, see State v. Washington, No. 
47773-1-I, 2002 WL 104492, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002). 
 31 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 745. 
 32 United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
May 23, 2007) (analogizing cell phones to laptops); see also United States v. Zavala, 
541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating, in the context of Terry stops, that “[a] cell 
phone is similar to a personal computer that is carried on one‟s person”); United States 
v. Urbina, No. 06-CR-336, 2007 WL 4895782, at *13-*14 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007) (“If 
the evidence in a future case were to show that the warrantless search conducted by 
law enforcement was essentially equivalent to a search of a personal computer, without 
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With that said, one state high court has recently rejected 
proposed analogies to both the address book and the laptop.33 
The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Smith, held that cell 
phone searches incident to arrest were unreasonable.34 While 
three justices bought the government‟s analogy to pagers (and 
therefore claimed the underlying search to be “reasonable”), the 
majority disagreed, observing that: 
[C]ell phones defy easy categorization. On one hand, they 
contain digital address books very much akin to traditional 
address books carried on the person . . . . On the other 
hand, they have the ability to transmit large amounts of 
data in various forms, likening them to laptop computers . 
. . . But cell phones are neither address books nor laptop 
computers.35 
Although the majority adopted neither of the proposed analo-
gies, it should be emphasized that it did not take issue with the 
concept of mono-analogical reasoning. To the contrary it seems 
to have embraced such reasoning. Finding no suitable analogs 
in place, the Court simply identified a new functional category 
which would be expected to serve as the touchstone for mono-
analogical reasoning in future cases.36 
  
sufficient exigencies to justify such a search, the court‟s reaction may be different, 
because of the substantial invasion of privacy.”). For commentary on the analogy be-
tween cell phones and laptops, see Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless 
Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 183, 221 (2010) (“Whatever rule applies to computers should certainly apply to 
new generation cellular devices . . . .”); Bryan Andrew Stillwagon, Bringing an End to 
Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 42 GA. L. REV. 1165, 1201 (2008) (urging “the judi-
ciary to recognize that cell phones are . . . much more analogous to modern computers 
than to wallets, briefcases, or even pagers”). 
 33 State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. The Court did not reject “mono-analogical” reasoning, but simply held that 
they could not find a “right” analog for cell phones within the existing state of 
precedent. Id. at 952 (noting that “whether the warrantless search of a cell phone 
passes constitutional muster depends upon how a cell phone is characterized”); id. at 
954 (stating that “the question becomes how [the cell phone] should be classified”). 
1328 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 80:4 
II. THE POLY-ANALOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The Problem: “Mono-Analogical” Reasoning 
The previous section identified how U.S. courts, in the face 
of emerging cell phone technologies, have gravitated toward a 
mode of reasoning marked by excessive reliance on functional 
analogies. The following paragraphs discuss the dangers of 
mono-analogical reasoning, emphasizing how it is indetermi-
nate, undisciplined, and (when utilized in the context of crimi-
nal procedure litigation) in disregard of some of the subtler les-
sons of Knotts and Kyllo.37 
(1) Indeterminate 
Mono-analogical reasoning is oftentimes indeterminate. 
After all, it casts judges in the roles of etymologist, linguist, 
and philosopher. Off they go: to discern and compare the Ideal 
of Cell Phoneness, of Address Bookness, and of Laptopness. 
This might remind one of H.L.A. Hart and “the most famous 
hypothetical in the common law world”: whether a statue of a 
truck violates the “no vehicles in the park” ordinance.38 Or of 
Professor Hunter‟s query whether a ferry is a “floating hotel” or 
merely a “seagoing train.”39 With each, there is (in some real 
sense) no “wrong” answer, let alone any readily identifiable 
way to evaluate the merits of a judicial decision. Such indeter-
minacy offers jurists wide discretion to reach conclusions post 
hoc.40 
  
 37 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 
(1983). 
 38 Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1109, 1109 (2008) (referring to Hart‟s example as “the most famous hypothetical in the 
common law world”); see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Mor-
als, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). 
 39 Hunter, supra note 9, at 1207. In the cell phone context, one might imagine the 
bench memo that reads: “Address book or laptop? Your call, Judge.” 
 40 One sees that, as a practical matter, mono-analogical reasoning has led to pro-
defendant decisions based on forced (and probably disingenuous) analogies. Too many 
of the pro-defendant decisions rest on awkward claims that traditional cell phones are 
like laptop computers, or, alternatively, that cell phones are not “immediately asso-
ciated with the person” pursuant to United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 
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(2) Undisciplined 
A second flaw with mono-analogical reasoning is that it 
leads courts to deviate over time (and often subconsciously) 
from the intended arc of precedent. Assume a court in 1982 
holds that it is permissible to conduct a warrantless search of a 
litigation bag found within the arrestee‟s grab area. And fur-
ther assume that thirty years later the same court is faced with 
the question of whether it is permissible to search word 
processing files saved on an iPhone found within the arrestee‟s 
grab area. Applying a mono-analogical method, a judge might 
very well find the search of the iPhone “reasonable”: 
(1) Litigation bags have certain functions X, Y, and Z; (2) 
iPhones differ functionally from litigation bags (for in-
stance, they offer functions A and B) but share functions X, 
Y, and Z; (3) The law permits warrantless searches of liti-
gation bags found within an arrestee‟s grab area; (4) Be-
cause iPhones share functions X, Y, and Z with litigation 
bags, the law should permit warrantless searches of 
iPhones found within an arrestee‟s grab area. 
So, what‟s the problem here? How might such a holding 
deviate from precedent? While the iPhone is (arguably) func-
tionally analogous to the litigation bag (both are mobile con-
tainers which store documents), the doctrine‟s application to 
iPhones exponentially increases the amount of private informa-
tion obtainable by the government without cause or a war-
rant.41 In 1982 perhaps only a few thousand people within the 
United States at a given point in time had litigation bags with-
in their grab area. (And, of this subset, perhaps only a few 
hundred people maintained large catalogs of privileged or per-
sonal documents in such bags). In 2012, perhaps fifty million 
people within the United States at any given moment will—due 
to developing technologies and shifting norms—maintain privi-
  
 41 See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 746 (“[A]nalogical reasoning goes wrong when 
there is an inadequate inquiry into the matter of relevant differences and governing 
principles.”); Blavin & Cohen, supra note 12, at 267 (stating that in the related concept 
of metaphors, “[c]ommentators have warned that the unreflective use of metaphors can 
lead lawyers to take for granted the „realities‟ that metaphors enable”). 
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leged or personal documents within their grab area. And of 
these fifty million a significant percentage are bound to be 
maintaining a large catalog of documents. So while the litiga-
tion bag is in many ways functionally analogous to the iPhone, 
it is possible (and perhaps likely) that the 1982 court, had it 
been able to foresee the future, would have incorporated limit-
ing principles into its decision to prevent this sort of mono-
analogical “slide.”42 Is it unreasonable for courts to transpose 
limiting principles onto decisions handed down in different 
times or places? Of course not. Any durable common law sys-
tem demands such inferences. Yet unfortunately, such infe-
rences are systematically foreclosed by mono-analogical reason-
ing. And so the use of mono-analogical reasoning creates, over 
time, a sort of “operator” effect: where the essence of past deci-
sions is but faintly recognizable in any of its alleged progeny. 
(3) Disregards Lessons of Knotts and Kyllo 
Third, mono-analogical reasoning disregards the subtle 
lessons of landmark criminal procedure decisions involving 
emerging technologies.43 In United States v. Knotts44 and Unit-
ed States v. Karo,45 the Supreme Court held that the use of a 
beeping tracking device does not violate expectations of privacy 
so long as it does not provide the government with information 
that would otherwise be unobtainable through lawful visual 
surveillance.46 The Knotts and Karo holdings stemmed, more or 
less, from a simple functional analogy: visual surveillance from 
public spaces is not a “search”; the use of a beeper to track per-
sons in public is functionally analogous to visual surveillance; 
  
 42 See generally City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“A broad 
holding concerning employees‟ privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided tech-
nological equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted. 
It is preferable to dispose of this case on narrower grounds.”). 
 43 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 
(1983). 
 44 460 U.S. 276. 
 45 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 46 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 (“Visual surveillance from public places along Petschen‟s 
route or adjoining Knotts‟ premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to 
the police.”). 
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thus, the use of a beeper to track persons in public does not 
constitute a “search.” Yet in important dictum Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the Knotts majority, suggested that a valid 
functional analogy could only carry the government so far: “If 
such [24-hour surveillance and] dragnet type law enforcement 
practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, 
there will be time enough then to determine whether different 
constitutional principles may be applicable.”47 Such was a tacit 
admission that functional analogies, while certainly of value, 
will not always be a sufficient condition of legal reasoning at 
the intersections of criminal procedure and emerging technolo-
gies. 
A second case disregarded by mono-analogical reasoning is 
Kyllo v. United States.48 The Court in Kyllo held that use of 
thermal-imaging technology on a home violated reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy.49 The government in that case proposed a 
functional analogy between thermal-imaging technology and 
ordinary visual surveillance. Justice Stevens, writing for the 
dissent, relied on such an analogy to conclude that Kyllo‟s 
house was not searched.50 
[T]he ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor 
or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building, 
particularly if it is vented, as was the case here. Addition-
ally, any member of the public might notice that one part 
of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby build-
ing if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts at 
different rates across its surfaces. Such use of the senses 
would not convert into an unreasonable search if, instead, 
an adjoining neighbor allowed an officer onto her property 
to verify her perceptions with a sensitive thermometer. 
Nor, in my view, does such observation become an unrea-
sonable search if made from a distance with the aid of a 
device that merely discloses that the exterior of one house, 
  
 47 Id. at 283-84 (Knotts had expressed “the generalized view that the result of the 
holding sought by the Government would be that „twenty-four hour surveillance of any 
citizen of this country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision.‟”). 
 48 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 49 Id. at 34. 
 50 Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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or one area of the house, is much warmer than another. 
Nothing more occurred in this case.51 
The majority opinion, while critical of the dissent on multiple 
fronts, let alone the analogy between visual surveillance and 
thermal-imaging technology. The merits of the analogy aside, 
Justice Scalia rejected the dissent‟s claim that such analogy 
was dispositive: “[w]e rejected such a mechanical interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, where the eavesdropping 
device picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of 
the phone booth.”52 Kyllo exemplifies how the efficiencies of a 
new technology can disrupt the citizen-state relationship to the 
point where functional analogies, even while technically valid, 
are deemed an inadequate mode of legal reasoning.53 
B. The Solution: “Poly-Analogical” Reasoning 
The lower courts‟ mediation of cyber-technologies and 
criminal procedure by resort to mono-analogical reasoning is 
flawed. And so two questions arise: First, what is missing? 
Second, what can be done? The missing component, as it turns 
out, is what I term “prevalence.” And the solution is to employ 
what I term an “analogy breaker.” Both concepts are discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
When courts are tasked with applying precedent to emerg-
ing technologies, it is imperative that they contemplate (if only 
generally) any implied limitations in past decisions.54 The ex-
cavation of implied limitations gives courts the foundation to 
  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 35 (majority opinion). In effect, the Kyllo Court read Katz as holding that 
the analogy between wiretaps and eavesdropping was non-dispositive. See Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 53 Admittedly the Court has been explicit that the increase in government efficien-
cy is not grounds, by itself, to find a reasonable expectation of privacy. See United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
 54 For example, when a court holds that a warrantless search of an address book 
incident to arrest is “reasonable,” it is making a finding that it is permissible in our 
society to give police discretion to read such address books without a warrant. And it is 
hard to deny that implicit in such a finding is the understanding that a certain percen-
tage of persons will at any given time be carrying an address book, and that those who 
do will tend to have only a limited amount of information in such books. 
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draw analogies regarding multiple dimensions of a new tech-
nological instrument. For lack of a better word, these other, 
non-functional dimensions might be referred to as “prevalence” 
dimensions. 
The term “prevalence” bundles at least three dimensions 
of any new technological instrument. First, “prevalence” relates 
to how an instrument, taken in conjunction with norms, alters 
the amount of data available (looking at searches in the aggre-
gate) within a traditional search domain.55 Second, “preva-
lence” relates to how an instrument, although functionally 
equivalent to traditional means of surveillance, affects the effi-
ciency of government surveillance.56 Third, “prevalence” relates 
to how an instrument, although functionally equivalent to tra-
ditional means of surveillance, affects the government‟s ability 
to aggregate information over time and across the population.57 
In each of these situations, “prevalence” reveals a practical im-
plication of an instrument that is hidden when only functions 
are considered. 
But even if this is right—that common sense, the internal 
structure of common law adjudication, and Fourth Amendment 
case law suggest that poly-analogous reasoning is theoretically 
superior to mono-analogous reasoning—how can these “preva-
  
 55 Examples include the Katz Court‟s recognition that norms of increased public 
phone usage altered the amount of data available through warrantless public phone 
wiretaps. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (“To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore 
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”). 
Beyond the technology realm, a good example is Justice Brennan‟s view that local 
ordinances prohibiting burning trash added value to traditional trash searches. See 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 55 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 56 Examples include the Kyllo Court‟s emphasis on the costs and unreliability of 
watching snow melt off roofs, the Dow Court‟s admission that a “search” might have 
occurred had the government photographs not been grainy, and the Katz Court‟s men-
tion of the infeasibility of officers eavesdropping on phone booths. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. 
at 35 n.2; Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986); Katz, 389 U.S. at 
352. While the Court has of course stated that surveillance “efficiency” is not a ground 
to recognize a new expectation of privacy, see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284, the Court‟s ac-
tions should speak at least as loudly as its words. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27. 
 57 The best example here is the Court‟s statement in Knotts that it would be willing 
to revisit its ruling, that the use of beepers to track public movements are not 
“searches,” should dragnet surveillance became commonplace. 460 U.S. at 284. 
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lence” dimensions be incorporated, as a practical matter, into 
the numerous criminal procedure doctrines? 
Incorporation, as it turns out, is easy. The “analogy break-
er” is a straightforward, supplemental analysis to be applied 
before courts adjust doctrine based on a functional analogy. To 
illustrate the “analogy breaker,” we return to the “search inci-
dent” doctrine. 
In the context of the “search incident” rules, the “analogy 
breaker” would provide: 
Do not rely on a functional analogy to allow warrantless 
searches of a new technological instrument if either: 
(1) the use of that instrument within the grab area (across 
the population); or 
(2) the information generally extractable from that item 
(across the population) 
is significantly greater than that associated with its function-
al analog at the time the search of the analog was first al-
lowed.58 
And, conversely, do not rely on a functional analogy to disal-
low warrantless searches of a new technological instrument if 
either: 
(1) the use of that instrument within the grab area (across 
the population); or 
(2) the information generally extractable from that item 
(across the population) 
is significantly less than that associated with its functional 
analog at the time the search of the analog was first disal-
lowed.59 
  
 58 While admittedly vague, the term “significantly” cannot be quantified. It seems 
permissible to leave this to judicial discretion. I would say, however, that the usage of 
cell phones is without a doubt “significantly” greater than that of address books. More-
over, the information generally extractable from a cell phone is “significantly” greater 
than that from an address book. 
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Note that if the functional analogy fails, or, alternatively, the 
functional analogy is “broken,” the reviewing court should un-
dertake a fresh “default” analysis of the new technological in-
strument.60 (For instance, in the “search incident to arrest” 
context, the default analysis would ask: “Do officers need to 
search cell phones in order to preserve their safety or to pre-
vent the destruction of evidence?”61) The “analogy breaker” 
does not despise functional analogies. It simply offers the 
courts a tool to identify misleading functional analogies and 
direct their analyses back to first principles. 
C. Application of Poly-Analogical Reasoning 
When we apply the “analogy breaker” to mediate the 
“search incident” rules and cell phone technology, we find three 
possible scenarios: 
A court could reject the functional analogy to address 
books and laptops. It would then resort to the default 
query.62 
  
 59 One should note that only a single strain of “prevalence,” relating to the amount 
of information affected, is relevant to the analogy breaker for the “search incident” 
doctrine. This is because the analyzed instrument is the target of the government ac-
tion rather than the instrument of government action. Conversely, the analogy breaker 
to consider the use of an instrument of government action (e.g., the scope of a “search”) 
turns on a consideration of alternative strains of “prevalence” (efficiency and aggrega-
tion). See infra Part II.D. 
 60 This would also have the effect of allowing courts to revisit precedent regarding 
a specific instrument if use within the grab area, or information generally extractable, 
decreases significantly with time. 
 61 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (explaining that the search inci-
dent doctrine is motivated by the need to protect officers and prevent the destruction of 
evidence). Courts at this level would also consider “intrusiveness.” See, e.g., Florida v. 
Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983). Intru-
siveness differs from prevalence as it focuses not on the windfall of information, but on 
the interruption of quality of experience. 
 62 The default query is: “Do officers need to search cell phones to preserve their 
safety or to prevent the destruction of evidence?” If the answer is yes, then the search 
is reasonable. If no, the search is unreasonable. For an example of similar legal reason-
ing in the “search incident” context, see Judge Werdegar‟s dissenting opinion in People 
v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 513 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“A particular context-
dependent balancing of constitutionally protected privacy interests against the police 
interests in safety and preservation of evidence led the United States Supreme Court, 
 
1336 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 80:4 
A court could adopt the functional analogy to address 
books. It would then apply the “analogy breaker,” asking 
whether the (1) the use of cell phones within the grab area 
(across the population); or (2) the information generally ex-
tractable from cell phones (across the population) are sig-
nificantly greater than that of the address book at the time 
the search of the address book was first allowed. If the an-
swer to both is no, then the functional analogy holds, and 
the cell phone will be treated in law like the address book. 
If the answer to one or both is yes, then the analogy is bro-
ken and the court should resort to the default query.63 
A court could adopt the functional analogy to laptops. It 
would then apply the “analogy breaker,” asking whether 
the (1) the use of cell phones within the grab area (across 
the population); or (2) the information generally extracta-
ble from cell phones (across the population) are significant-
ly less than that of the laptop at the time the search of the 
laptop was first disallowed. If the answer to both is no, 
then the analogy holds, and the cell phone is treated in law 
like the laptop. If the answer to one or both is yes, then the 
analogy is broken and the court should resort to the de-
fault query.64 
One immediate concern might be that judges lack the expertise 
to determine the applicable “usage” or “extract” rates. Such a 
concern, however, is unreasonable. At least in the context of 
criminal procedure, nearly all of the vanguard cyberspace is-
sues are litigated with assistance from public interest groups. 
These groups have the resources to commission studies and 
retain the experts required to estimate the various “preva-
lence” dimensions of all new and relevant technological in-
struments.65 Litigants are therefore quite capable of educating 
  
over 30 years ago, to hold searches of the arrestee‟s person reasonable despite the lack 
of probable cause or a warrant and despite substantial delay between the arrest and 
the search. Today, in a very different context of mobile phones and related devices, that 
balance must be newly evaluated.” (citation omitted)). 
 63 See supra note 62. 
 64 See supra note 62. 
 65 Examples include the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the ACLU‟s Technolo-
gy and Liberty Program. 
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courts to render competent and informed judgments in their 
applications of “analogy breakers.” 
D. Extrapolating the Analogy Breaker 
The “analogy breaker” is not confined to “search incident” 
doctrine, but can be applied across the spectrum of criminal 
procedure issues.66 Take the perennial question of whether the 
government‟s use of a new surveillance instrument constitutes 
a Fourth Amendment “search.” The “analogy breaker” in this 
context would preclude a court from holding “no search” 
through a mere functional analogy if either (1) the efficiencies 
of collection gained by the new surveillance instrument, or (2) 
the ability to aggregate information through the new surveil-
lance instrument, is significantly greater than its functional 
analog at the time the court first held that its use did not con-
stitute a “search.”67 Of course the breaking of the analogy 
would not mean that the use of the challenged surveillance in-
strument constitutes a “search”—it would simply mean that 
the court must engage in a fresh analysis of whether the in-
strument‟s use violates a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”68 
For instance, consider GPS tracking devices. Knotts and 
Karo held, as a general matter, that no expectations of privacy 
are violated when one is tracked by a beeper in public. Beeper 
surveillance is functionally analogous to GPS surveillance 
(both are used to locate a moving entity). A court might be 
prone to extend this ruling, through mono-analogical reason-
  
 66 So even if the cell phone cases are resolved in a different manner (e.g., extending 
Arizona v. Gant to non-vehicle arrests), the lessons from the lower court‟s treatment of 
cell phone searches can be extrapolated to other areas of criminal procedure. 
 67 Note that the relevance of “reliability” and “aggregating power” can be inferred 
from Kyllo and Knotts. See supra notes 56 & 57. 
 68  See generally Freiwald, supra note 12, at ¶8 (“It requires them first to analyze 
society‟s views about the intricacies of new technologies that most users, including 
judges, do not understand. Properly done, the reasonable expectation of privacy analy-
sis also requires that courts supplement that positive finding with a normative inquiry 
into the role of new communications technologies and whether users should be entitled 
to believe such communications are private. Courts have either avoided the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis, or have cut short the analysis, because they lack ade-
quate empirical data for the positive inquiry and adequate guidance for the normative 
one.” (footnote omitted)). 
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ing, to GPS surveillance. Yet such an analysis would ignore the 
“prevalence” dimensions of GPS technology. Through applica-
tion of the “analogy breaker,” a court should ask, before alter-
ing the “search” doctrine, whether (1) the efficiencies of collec-
tion gained by GPS, or (2) the ability to aggregate information 
through GPS, is significantly greater than that which was as-
sociated with beeping devices at the time the Court ruled on 
beepers. If the answer to both is no, then the reviewing court 
should hold that there is no expectation of privacy to be free of 
GPS surveillance while in public. If the answer to one or both is 
yes, then the court should undertake a fresh analysis (denuded 
of the functional analogy between GPS and beepers) whether 
persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy to be free 
from GPS surveillance while in public. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts naturally and necessarily turn to analogical rea-
soning to incorporate cyber-technologies into existing doctrinal 
rules. And when it comes to criminal procedure, the preferred 
form of legal reasoning has been mono-analogous. Such reason-
ing, however, is indeterminate, undisciplined, and in disregard 
of the subtleties of landmark cases like Knotts and Kyllo. This 
article suggests, as an alternative, a poly-analogous approach: 
one that respects the necessity for functional comparisons but 
at the same time gives due credit to the practical dimensions of 
emerging technologies. Such practical dimensions can be incor-
porated into prevailing doctrine with little difficulty. The 
“analogy breaker,” applicable across the spectrum of criminal 
procedure doctrine, will help courts identify the essence of 
precedent and, as a result, effectively mediate old criminal pro-
cedure rules and new technologies. 
 
